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The Impact of Religiosity on Audit Pricing 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 Abstract 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 Prior  literature  has  demonstrated  that  religiosity  is  associated  with  a  reduced 
11 
12 
acceptance of unethical business practices and financial reporting irregularities. On 
13 
14 
15 this  premise,  we  examine  whether  religiosity,  conceptualized  as  the  degree  of 
16 
17 adherence to religious norms in the geographical area where a firm’s headquarters is 
18 
19 
20 located, has an impact on audit firms’ pricing decisions in the US. We measure the 
21 
22 intensity of religiosity by the number of adherents relative to the total population in a 
23 
24 
25 county  and  we  demonstrate  that  increased  religious  adherence  operates  as  an 
26 
27 institutionalized  monitoring  mechanism  that  decreases  audit  risk  and  audit  costs, 
28 
29 
which is, in turn, reflected in reduced audit pricing. Additional tests suggest that the 
31 
32 impact of religiosity on auditors’ pricing decisions is not differentiated by levels of 
33 
34 
auditor expertise but that audit fees are determined by an auditor’s relative location in 
35 
36 
37 a  market  sector  and  religious  adherence.  We  conclude  that  religious  adherence 
38 
39 reduces the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents, a finding 
40 
41 
42 which could be of importance for market participants and regulators. 
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48 
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Introduction 
1 
2 The influential role of religious adherence in shaping economic behavior has long 
3 
4 
5 been discussed by influential thinkers such as Adam Smith (Smith [1759], 1976) and 
6 
7 Weber (1905). More recently, social scientists have provided overwhelming evidence 
8 
9 
to suggest that religiosity, conceptualized as the degree to which an individual adheres 
11 
12 to the values, beliefs and practices promulgated by religion, plays a major role in 
13 
14 
affecting  individual  values,  beliefs  and  economic  choices  (Barnett  et  al.,  1996; 
16 
17 Innaccone, 1998; Kennedy and Lawton, 1998; Lehrer, 2004; Shukor and Jamal, 2013; 
18 
19 
Vitell, 2009; Weaver and Angle, 2002). In particular, scholars have demonstrated that 
20 
21 
22 religious individuals are more likely to adopt honest attitudes (Bloodgood et al. 2008; 
23 
24 Mazar et al., 2008; Walker et al., 2012), be more concerned about corporations’ social 
25 
26 
27 responsiveness in societies (Brammer et al., 2007) and to prioritize ethics in everyday 
28 
29 decision making, thus marginalizing their own self-interests (Hunt and Vitell, 1986). 
30 
31 
Accordingly,  although  prior  literature  does  not  claim  that  ethical  attitudes  are 
33 
34 exclusively determined by religious adherence (for instance, see Kurpis et al., 2008; 
35 
36 
Peterson et al., 2010; Rashid and Ibrahim, 2008), it does clearly demonstrate that 
37 
38 
39 religious adherence is positively associated with ethical behavior (Vitell, 2009). 
40 
41 While the literature has long illuminated the role of religiosity1 in influencing 
42 
43 
44 individual economic attitudes, only recently has an investigation of the impact of 
45 
46 religious adherence on corporate decision-making emerged. This is the result of a 
47 
48 
three-fold  trend.  Firstly,  economists  have  begun  demonstrating  the  fundamental 
50 
51 impact  of  religiosity  on  core  economic  matters  (Barro  and  McCleary,  2003; 
52 
53 
Innaccone, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Stulz and Williamson, 2003). Secondly, the 
54 
55 
56 role  of  religion  has  become  more  influential  in  the  US 2   and  internationally 
57 
58 (Innaccone, 1998; Tracey, 2012). Thirdly, influential religious groups, comprising of 
59 
60 
61 
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Muslims, Christians and Jews, have issued a common code of ethics for international 
1 
2 business (Interfaith Declaration, 1994). This indicates a clear tendency to converge on 
3 
4 
5 certain ethical values and promulgate justice, fairness, transparency and 
6 
7 accountability as the main interfaith pillars of corporate ethics and responsibilities 
8 
9 
(ICCR, 2010; 2015; Webley, 1996). 
11 
12 This emerging branch of literature demonstrates that religiosity has an impact 
13 
14 
on investors’ portfolio choices and stock returns (Kumar et al., 2011). Hilary and Hui 
16 
17 (2009)  show  that  companies  located  in  more  religious  areas  have  lower  profit 
18 
19 
volatility  and  lower  investment  rates  and  growth,  but  greater  profitability.  Such 
20 
21 
22 companies  generate  a  more  positive  market  reaction  when  they  announce  new 
23 
24 investments (ibid.). Additionally, religiosity is argued to operate as an 
25 
26 
27 institutionalized mechanism through which risk-averse (Miller and Hoffman, 1995; 
28 
29 Osoba, 2003), anti-manipulative attitudes (Callen and Fang, 2015) are disseminated 
30 
31 
and reinforced. Hence, in more religious contexts, corporate behavior becomes more 
33 
34 socially responsive (Angelidis and Ibrahim, 2004; Guiso et al., 2006). 
35 
36 
One wonders, as a result of this literature, whether religiosity plays any role in 
37 
38 
39 accounting and/or auditing decisions and, although such an investigation has been 
40 
41 considered  vital  (Sunder,  2005),  relevant  research  is  nevertheless  in  its  infancy 
42 
43 
44 (Dyreng et al., 2012). The limited research conducted thus far has provided strong 
45 
46 evidence of the influential role of religious adherence in financial reporting decisions. 
47 
48 
While acknowledging that corporate failures and malpractice do take place even in 
50 
51 highly religious locations, this stream of literature underlines that the frequency of 
52 
53 
corporate failures and malpractice intensifies in less religious locations 
54 
55 
56 (Kanagaretnam et al., 2014). Conroy and Emerson (2004) and Longenecker et al. 
57 
58 (2004) demonstrate that accounting manipulations are less likely to be conducted by 
59 
60 
61 
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firms headquartered in more religious geographical areas. Moreover, recent evidence 
1 
2 suggests that fewer incidences of financial reporting irregularities and tax sheltering, 
3 
4 
5 lower accounting risk, and a lower likelihood of accounting restatements occur in 
6 
7 contexts characterized by high religious adherence (Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 
8 
9 
2010; McGuire et al., 2012). Dyreng et al. (2012) additionally find that capital market 
11 
12 participants respond to reported good news on earnings in a manner that is consistent 
13 
14 
with investors acknowledging the role of religiosity in curbing aggressive financial 
16 
17 reporting. 
18 
19 
By focusing on the auditing realm,  Omer et  al.  (2015) shed light on the 
20 
21 
22 relationship between religiosity and auditing practice. They demonstrate that, in more 
23 
24 religious contexts, auditors show higher professional skepticism which enables them 
25 
26 
27 to exhibit a greater determination to resist client pressure to withhold going concern 
28 
29 opinions. In a similar vein, Basioudis et al. (2014) examine the impact of religiosity 
30 
31 
on non-audit fees and auditors’ propensity to issue going concern opinions. They 
33 
34 suggest that auditors in more religious US counties are highly likely to be more 
35 
36 
independent. Jaggi and Xin (2014) document that, in highly religious environments, 
37 
38 
39 auditors adopt strong ethical and risk-averse attitudes when accepting risky clients; 
40 
41 these attitudes then affect audit pricing policies. Finally, Jha and Chen (2015) find 
42 
43 
44 that there is a strong association between firms headquartered in US counties with 
45 
46 high social capital, i.e. high mutual trust, and audit fees and briefly evaluate the 
47 
48 
negative association between religiosity and audit pricing policies. 
50 
51 Considering  insights  provided  by  previous  studies,  we  embark  upon  an 
52 
53 
examination of the impact of religiosity on audit fees at a firm-level. Religiosity can 
54 
55 
56 be operationalized in two main ways, which are inextricably linked to the research 
57 
58 focus. Prior studies, which put the individual at the epicenter of the analysis, primarily 
59 
60 
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employ tools such as (electronic or mail) surveys and interviews to measure aspects of 
1 
2 individual religiosity, i.e. belief, practice, formal membership, informal affiliation, 
3 
4 
5 ritual  initiation,  doctrinal  knowledge,  moral  sense  and  core  values  (Barro  and 
6 
7 McCleary, 2003; Doran and Natale, 2011, Keller et al., 2007; Lynn et al., 2009; 
8 
9 
McAndrew and Voas, 2011; Roberts and Yamane, 2012; Shukor and Jamal, 2013; 
11 
12 Walker et al., 2012; Zwingmann et al., 2011). 
13 
14 
However,  researchers  interested  in  studying  religiosity  at  a  firm-level 
16 
17 operationalize  it  by employing  variables  which  measure  the  number  of  sites  for 
18 
19 
religious  activities  (e.g.  churches,  mosques,  etc.),  the  religious  population  as  a 
20 
21 
22 proportion of the total population, and/or the extent of religious participation within 
23 
24 the county or region where the firm is headquartered (Boone et al., 2013; Callen and 
25 
26 
27 Fang, 2015; Chourou, 2014; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010; Hilary and Hui, 
28 
29 2009;  Kumar  et  al.,  2011).  These  studies  have  employed  the  county-location  of 
30 
31 
corporate headquarters as a basis for the operationalization of company location (see 
33 
34 also Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011; Kose et  al., 2011;  Loughran and Schultz, 2005; 
35 
36 
McGuire et al., 2012; Rubbin, 2008). 
37 
38 
39 Since our main objective is to decipher the effect of religiosity on audit pricing 
40 
41 at a firm-level in the US, we follow the latter stream of literature (Boone et al., 2013; 
42 
43 
44 Callen and Fang, 2015; Chourou, 2013; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010; 
45 
46 Hilary  and  Hui,  2009;  Kumar  et  al.,  2011).  Hence,  we  measure  the  degree  of 
47 
48 
religiosity in the county where a firm’s headquarters is located, i.e. the number of 
50 
51 adherents  relative  to  the  total  county  population.  We  mainly  rely  on  Religious 
52 
53 
Congregations and Membership Studies (RCMS), as distributed by the American 
54 
55 
56 Religion Data Archive, to measure religiosity. Our data refer to 141.372(150.686) 
57 
58 million adherents across all US counties for the year 2003(2010). We also employ 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
7  
10 
15 
32 
49 
data from the Pew Forum and the Religious Landscape Survey to develop additional 
1 
2 religiosity measures. Thus, based on a sample of 35,957 adults, we develop four 
3 
4 
5 additional proxies related to: a) the importance of religion in people's lives, b) the 
6 
7 frequency of attendance at worship services, c) the frequency of prayer and d) the 
8 
9 
absolute certainty of belief in God. Our final sample comprises of 1,272 US-listed 
11 
12 firms for an eight-year estimation window (2003-2010). 
13 
14 
There are concurrent and complementary studies to ours in the literature (Jaggi 
16 
17 and  Xin,  2014;  Jha  and  Chen,  2015;  Omer  et  al.  2015).  However,  our  study 
18 
19 
significantly differs from previous works in a number of ways. While Jaggi and Xin 
20 
21 
22 (2014) document an inverse relation between religious norms and audit pricing by 
23 
24 considering the level of religious values of the counties where auditors are located, 
25 
26 
27 our study considers the religious values of the counties where corporate headquarters 
28 
29 are located, while sensitivity testing the level of religiosity at the auditor location. 
30 
31 
Moreover,  we  also  employ  alternative  measures  of  religiosity  and  incorporate 
33 
34 extensions relating to auditor spatial competition and industry expertise. Omer et al. 
35 
36 
(2015) mainly implement a different operationalization of audit quality to the one we 
37 
38 
39 employ in this study. While they examine the impact of religiosity on the propensity 
40 
41 of auditors to issue a going concern opinion, we focus on audit pricing. Finally, while 
42 
43 
44 Jha and Chen (2015) only briefly consider the role of religiosity on audit pricing 
45 
46 (since their main focus is on social capital), our study focuses on the impact of 
47 
48 
religiosity  on  audit  risk  and  discusses  how  religiosity  acts  as  an  institutional 
50 
51 monitoring  mechanism  that  reduces  audit  costs,  i.e.  resource  and  expected  loss 
52 
53 
components. 
54 
55 
56 Our study contributes to the current literature in a number of ways.  The 
57 
58 primary  contribution  is  the  finding  that  religiosity  impacts  on  audit  fees.  The 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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importance  of  this  is  that,  while  previous  literature  has  primarily  focused  on 
1 
2 company- and audit-specific variables (e.g. Bierstaker et al., 2006; Causholli et al., 
3 
4 
5 2010; Hay et al., 2006), we extend prior understandings by bringing to the fore a non- 
6 
7 market factor, namely religiosity, which is related to the broader institutional context 
8 
9 
and lies beyond the immediate control of managers or auditors. Secondly, our analysis 
11 
12 verifies previous findings that religiosity acts as an external monitoring device which 
13 
14 
is related to risk-averse and conservative investment policies at a firm-level. Thus, 
16 
17 religiosity is related to reduced agency costs which benefit shareholders in companies 
18 
19 
located in more religious areas. In this sense, we draw attention to the substitutive 
20 
21 
22 rather than complementary role of the institutionalized control quality of religiosity in 
23 
24 relation to auditing. This finding extends research that investigates the impact of 
25 
26 
27 external monitoring on audit practices and research that examines the influence of 
28 
29 religious adherence on corporate policies. Finally, we further understandings of the 
30 
31 
determination of audit fee levels by incorporating the level of auditor expertise and 
33 
34 the auditor’s relative location in a market sector into our model. 
35 
36 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we develop 
37 
38 
39 the hypothesis. In the third section we explain the data collection procedure, proxy 
40 
41 operationalization  and  the  empirical  model.  The  results  and  sensitivity  tests  are 
42 
43 
44 presented in the fourth section, and in the fifth section we conclude the study. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Religious adherence and audit pricing 
50 
51 Socially-endorsed patterns of behavior play a major role in affecting and guiding 
52 
53 
individual  attitudes  and  behavior  (Cialdini,  1993;  Elster,  1989;  Festre,  2010; 
54 
55 
56 Kohlberg, 1984; Sunstein, 1996). Embodying certain values and beliefs, endorsed 
57 
58 patterns of behavior are “shared by a group [and] sustained both by sanctions and by 
59 
60 
61 
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emotions of guilt and shame” (Festre, 2010, p. 514). These patterns of behavior enjoin 
1 
2 a group’s followers to forgo selfish benefits in the name of group benefits. Individuals 
3 
4 
5 may tend to comply with the understandings and expectations of their peer groups in 
6 
7 order to avoid potential sanctions and, most importantly, to avoid being socially 
8 
9 
stigmatized and possibly isolated as a result of non-adherence to prevailing values and 
11 
12 beliefs  (Elster,  1989;  Festre,  2010;  Kohlberg,  1984;  Sunstein,  1996).  Moreover, 
13 
14 
accepted attitudes are usually rewarded with social approval and strong community 
16 
17 support. 
18 
19 
Patterns of endorsed behavior are, inter alia, shaped and disseminated through 
20 
21 
22 the  operations  of  organized  religious  groups  (Brammer  et  al.,  2007).  Religious 
23 
24 communities offer role expectations and create conceptual frameworks according to 
25 
26 
27 which  individuals  develop  certain  understandings  and  construct  their  own  self- 
28 
29 identities (Weaver and Angle, 2002). Repeated social interaction, achieved mainly 
30 
31 
through attendance of ceremonies and other religious events, assists individuals in 
33 
34 internalizing religious role expectations and the values promulgated by the specific 
35 
36 
community  (Kennedy  and  Lawton,  1998;  Lehrer,  2004;  McGuire  et  al.,  2012; 
37 
38 
39 Sunstain, 1996; Weaver and Angle 2002). Although religious identities may not have 
40 
41 the same significance for each member, categories of religious role expectations may 
42 
43 
44 nevertheless have an impact on influencing individual behavior (Weaver and Angle, 
45 
46 2002). 
47 
48 
Religious adherence has also been identified as an influential parameter of 
50 
51 economic behavior (Brammer et al., 2007; Vitell 2009). Hunt and Vitell (1986), for 
52 
53 
instance, show that religion plays an essential role in determining not only judgments 
54 
55 
56 and intentions regarding a particular situation, but also the specific courses of action, 
57 
58 i.e. the actual behavior. This is substantiated by a recent branch of the literature which 
59 
60 
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demonstrates that there is a positive association between religious adherence and 
1 
2 individual economic attitudes characterized by risk aversion, an anti-manipulative 
3 
4 
5 ethos, self-control, honesty and conservatism
3 (Callen and Fang, 2015; Diaz, 2000; 
6 
7 Mazar et al., 2008; McCullough and Willoughby, 2009; Miller and Hoffman, 1995). 
8 
9 
Influences and pressures on economic attitudes also affect decision making at 
11 
12 the firm-level (Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Kumar 
13 
14 
et al., 2011). Corporate attitudes are, to a certain degree, shaped by the prevailing 
16 
17 values and endorsed behaviors in a geographical area. Recent literature shows that 
18 
19 
such influences take a more concrete form in locations where religious adherents 
20 
21 
22 constitute the predominant element of the local population (Boone et al., 2013; Callen 
23 
24 and Fang, 2015; Chourou, 2013; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010; Hilary and 
25 
26 
27 Hui, 2009; Kumar et al., 2011). Extant literature provides insights into the main 
28 
29 processes/conformity mechanisms through which corporate behavior is affected by 
30 
31 
the religious values in an area. Firstly, to the extent that religious individuals are 
33 
34 concentrated in a county, firms located in this county are likely to employ a larger 
35 
36 
proportion  of  religious  people  at  all  levels  of  the  organization.  In  this  sense, 
37 
38 
39 “managerial   style,   corporate   culture,   employees’   preferences,   and   investment 
40 
41 behavior […] is generally aligned with the local environment of the firm” (Hilary and 
42 
43 
44 Hui, 2009, p. 459). 
45 
46 Secondly, having internalized religious values and adopted ethical intentions, 
47 
48 
religious adherents employed in firms are highly likely to feel religion-bound to blow 
50 
51 the whistle on errant conduct (Barnett et al., 1996; Callen and Fang, 2015; Javers, 
52 
53 
2011). This is probable since religious individuals have developed strong identities 
54 
55 
56 outside their work life and are not usually so caught up in their place on the corporate 
57 
58 ladder. This makes it easier for them to unmask irregular corporate activities4. Javers 
59 
60 
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(2011)   argues   that   a   number   of   recent   litigation   cases   against   well-known 
1 
2 corporations5 have been instigated by religious middle and upper-middle managers 
3 
4 
5 knowledgeable of the firm’s internal workings. In most cases, the 
6 
7 irregularities/manipulations were publicly exposed and fines were imposed on the 
8 
9 
corporations involved. In a similar vein, Callen and Fang (2015) argue that, in more 
11 
12 religious contexts, even if managers were tempted to withhold bad news regarding 
13 
14 
earnings for personal gain (when, for instance, their compensation is tied to earnings), 
16 
17 they  would  avoid  accounting  malpractice  for  fear  of  such  manipulations  being 
18 
19 
publicly exposed by religious individuals. 
20 
21 
22 Thirdly, while managers may not necessarily be active participants in any 
23 
24 particular religion, the likelihood of interaction with religious individuals increases in 
25 
26 
27 locations where a large faction of the population is religious (Dyreng et al., 2012, p. 
28 
29 849). Through social interaction with local groups, managers familiarize themselves 
30 
31 
with the locally-accepted written or unwritten rules that guide and constrain behavior, 
33 
34 which may mean they keep their own behavior in line with endorsed patterns (Dyreng 
35 
36 
et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012). It is highly likely that managers will conform to 
37 
38 
39 values adhered to by the social group in order to avoid disutility from deviation 
40 
41 sanctions. Failure to conform to a locality’s endorsed patterns of behavior generates 
42 
43 
44 strong levels of cognitive dissonance and emotional discomfort (Boone et al., 2013, p. 
45 
46 54; Callen and Fang, 2015, p. 11). Hence, it is maintained that, even if managers’ 
47 
48 
religiosity was only “skin deep”, they would still avoid  deviating from  religious 
50 
51 values  for  fear  of  being  stigmatized,  since  the  cost  of  the  social  stigma  often 
52 
53 
outweighs the potential pecuniary gains from non-endorsed activities (Callen and 
54 
55 
56 Fang, 2015). 
57 
58 
59 
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The conformity mechanisms at work consequently entail that misleading and 
1 
2 undesired accounting practices are less likely to be undertaken by managers in more 
3 
4 
5 religious  geographical  areas,  since  religiosity  is  viewed  as  an  institutionalized 
6 
7 monitoring mechanism which enhances accountability and transparency (Boone et al., 
8 
9 
2013; Callen and Fang, 2015; Chourou, 2013; Dyreng et al., 2012; Grullon et al., 
11 
12 2010; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Kumar et al., 2011). 
13 
14 
Recent  studies  demonstrate  that  the  geographical  location  of  corporate 
16 
17 headquarters  is  a  central  place  where  not  only important  business  decisions  and 
18 
19 
policies are made, but also where managerial mentalities, attitudes and behaviors 
20 
21 
22 emerge  and  develop  (Coval  and  Moskowitz,  2001;  Davis  and  Henderson,  2008; 
23 
24 Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Porter, 1998; 2000; Rubbin, 2008). It is actually the main 
25 
26 
27 place where managers reside, meet and make decisions (Porter, 1998; 2000; Rubbin, 
28 
29 2008). Moreover, it serves as the epicenter of information distribution and exchange 
30 
31 
between the firm and various market participants (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Davis 
33 
34 and  Henderson,  2008;  Pirinsky  and  Wang,  2006).  In  this  sense,  the  location  of 
35 
36 
corporate headquarters emerges as the geographical area where managers, who make 
37 
38 
39 business  decisions  and  affect  policies  at  the  firm-level,  interact  with  prevailing 
40 
41 attitudes and behaviors (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011; Kose et al., 2011; Loughran and 
42 
43 
44 Schultz, 2005; McGuire et al., 2012; Rubbin, 2008). Hence, the level of religious 
45 
46 adherence in the area where a company is domiciled (headquartered) is related to 
47 
48 
business practices and accounting risk, incidences of financial reporting irregularities, 
50 
51 and the frequency of accounting restatements (Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Dyreng et 
52 
53 
al., 2012; Grullon et al., 2010; Longenecker et al., 2004; McGuire et al., 2012). 
54 
55 
56 However, acknowledging that religiosity is associated with the quality of financial 
57 
58 
59 
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reporting entails that religious adherence may also be related to auditing practice and, 
1 
2 by extension, to audit pricing levels. 
3 
4 
5 To make sense of the relationship between religiosity and audit pricing, we 
6 
7 rely on the seminal work by Simunic (1980), who demonstrated that audit fees consist 
8 
9 
of a resource cost component and an expected loss component. Subsequent empirical 
11 
12 studies have shown that various factors related to the client’s broader context affect 
13 
14 
the resource and expected loss components in the audit pricing model (Gietzmann and 
16 
17 Pettinicchio, 2013; Jaggi and Xin, 2014; Jha and Chen, 2015; Lyon and Maher, 2005). 
18 
19 
For  instance,  Brumfield,  Elliott,  and  Jacobson  (1983)  argue  that  client 
20 
21 
22 characteristics  (such  as  management  attitude  with  respect  to  operational  and 
23 
24 accounting matters, the existence of and potential for litigation, and the existence of 
25 
26 
27 and potential for regulatory intervention) influence auditors’ perceptions of the client 
28 
29 and, most significantly, their assessment of the level of audit risk. The authors argue 
30 
31 
that when an audit firm accepts a client with a perceived high business risk, the 
33 
34 auditor may respond to this risk by increasing the amount of audit work (i.e., higher 
35 
36 
resource  component)  or  increasing  the  billing  rate  (i.e.,  higher  expected  loss 
37 
38 
39 component), or both. 
40 
41 On the basis of social norm theory and the audit pricing model, we argue that, 
42 
43 
44 in more religious areas, managers responsible for corporate policy making are highly 
45 
46 likely to develop risk-averse, anti-manipulative and conservative attitudes towards 
47 
48 
investment policies and business processes. This tendency is taken into consideration 
50 
51 by  auditors  who  are  expected  to  adjust  the  cost  resource  and  expected  loss 
52 
53 
components of the audit pricing model in two different ways which are discussed in 
54 
55 
56 the following paragraphs. 
57 
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In highly religious contexts, auditors would possibly assess a significantly 
1 
2 lower  engagement  risk 6  due  to  the  more  ethical  attitudes  adopted  by  managers. 
3 
4 
5 Auditor assessments would result in a re-planning of the nature, timing and extent of 
6 
7 audit procedures (Bell et al. 2001; Fukukawa et al., 2006; Graham and Bedard, 2003; 
8 
9 
Houston et al., 1999; Johnstone, 2000; Niemi, 2002). The lower engagement risk 
11 
12 identified in highly religious contexts should lead the auditor to an estimation of a 
13 
14 
lower resource component, which translates into less audit effort. 
16 
17 Moreover, the auditor’s assessment of the engagement risk is affected by the 
18 
19 
likelihood of litigation, which constitutes an essential element of the audit pricing 
20 
21 
22 model  (e.g.  Lyon  and  Maher,  2005).  On  this  premise,  we  maintain  that  the 
23 
24 institutional role of religiosity as a control mechanism that mitigates errant accounting 
25 
26 
27 practice may also lead auditors to perceive a lower risk of potential litigation in more 
28 
29 religious  areas.  In  such  contexts,  the  auditor’s  analysis  of  the  expected  loss 
30 
31 
component  is  highly  likely  to  lead  to  a  reduced  billing  rate.  In  light  of  the 
33 
34 aforementioned rationales, we argue that religiosity operates as a substitutive control 
35 
36 
mechanism to auditing and, through its impact on the resource and/or expected loss 
37 
38 
39 component, is negatively associated with audit fees. 
40 
41 Alternatively, however, executives and employees who operate in companies 
42 
43 
44 headquartered in more religious contexts may be more concerned about the quality of 
45 
46 controls  and  financial  reporting,  since  deviations  from  values  associated  with  a 
47 
48 
reduced  acceptance  of  unethical  business  practices  and  incidences  of  financial 
50 
51 reporting  irregularities  may  lead  them  to  encounter  social  disutility  and  severe 
52 
53 
sanctions. Thus, being risk-averse and more conservative, managers may invest in 
54 
55 
56 more intense audits and require auditors to undertake extended processes to increase 
57 
58 the degree of audit assurance. As a result, operating in a context where there is a high 
59 
60 
61 
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demand for more thorough audits, the auditor would identify a higher engagement 
1 
2 risk and estimate a higher resource component, i.e. more audit effort. 
3 
4 
5 Auditors may also perceive that, in highly religious areas, the risk of litigation 
6 
7 could be much higher as a result of managers’ and third parties’ reduced tolerance of 
8 
9 
errant behavior. Thus, the auditor meets the increased litigation risk with higher audit 
11 
12 fees; in other words, the higher expected loss component necessitates an increase in 
13 
14 
the billing rate. In this sense, religiosity is expected to operate as a complementary 
16 
17 rather  than  substitutive  monitoring  mechanism  to  auditing,  given  that  higher 
18 
19 
religiosity is related to the more detailed and meticulous planning of the nature, 
20 
21 
22 timing and extent of audit procedures on behalf of auditors and/or higher litigation 
23 
24 risk. Thus, religiosity may be associated with higher audit pricing. 
25 
26 
27 Against the background of social norm theory and the audit pricing model, our 
28 
29 formal, testable hypothesis reads as follows: 
30 
31 
H: Ceteris paribus, the level of religious adherence in the location a firm is 
33 
34 headquartered impacts on the level of audit fees. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 Research design 
40 
41 Data 
42 
43 
44 To test our predictions we focus on a single country, the US, for the following 
45 
46 reasons: Firstly, by focusing on one country we obtain a homogenous sample in terms 
47 
48 
of  the  underlying  financial  and  economic  development,  legal  structure,  public 
50 
51 infrastructure  and  relevant  institutional  characteristics  (Hilary  and  Hui,  2009). 
52 
53 
Secondly, in the US, religion has achieved a very influential role (Innaccone, 1998; 
54 
55 
56 Norris and Inglehart, 2004) and is expected to become even more prominent in the 
57 
58 future (see Newport, 2012). Thirdly, the US is a favorable setting due to its religious 
59 
60 
61 
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diversity (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This enables religiosity to be operationalized 
1 
2 based  on  multiple  beliefs,  practices  and  understandings  –  avoiding  potential 
3 
4 
5 limitations due to single denominations (e.g. Catholics in Italy and Poland, Orthodox 
6 
7 Christians in Russia and so on). Finally, rich datasets are available. 
8 
9 
We start with all US publicly-listed firms for which continuous fee data are 
11 
12 available on the Audit Analytics database for the period 2003-2010. We focus on the 
13 
14 
post Sarbanes-Oxley era, since cleaner datasets are available from that point onwards 
16 
17 (Francis  and  Yu,  2009).  This  yields  4,039  firms  available  for  the  whole  of  our 
18 
19 
estimation window. Similar to prior literature (Causholli et al., 2010), we exclude 
20 
21 
22 1,264 financial firms due to differential operations and regulations. We then eliminate 
23 
24 a further 1,503 firms due to unavailable or missing data on Compustat. Our final 
25 
26 
27 sample consists of 1,272 firms for eight years, i.e. 10,176 firm-year observations. 
28 
29 Following prior literature (Hilary and Hui, 2009; McGuire et al., 2012; Pirinsky and 
30 
31 
Wang, 2006), we define a firm’s location as the location of its headquarters, since 
33 
34 corporate headquarters are close to the core corporate business activities (Pirinsky and 
35 
36 
Wang, 2006) and it is the place where managers reside, meet and take decisions 
37 
38 
39 (Porter,  1998;  2000;  Rubbin,  2008).  Information  about  headquarter  locations  is 
40 
41 obtained from Compustat and Audit Analytics7. Our sample firms reside in 335 US 
42 
43 
44 counties spread over 48 states (the exceptions being the District of Columbia, New 
45 
46 Hampshire and Rhode Island). 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 Measuring religiosity 
52 
53 
Similar to prior studies (Dyreng et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009), we operationalize 
54 
55 
56 our  main  religiosity  measure  by  drawing  upon  Religious  Congregations  and 
57 
58 Membership   Studies   (RCMS),   published   by   Glenmary   Research   Center   and 
59 
60 
61 
62 
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distributed by the American Religion Data Archive 8 . In 2000(2010), each of the 
1 
2 285(296) US-domiciled denominations listed in the Yearbook of American Churches9 
3 
4 
5 was asked to report the number of churches, members and adherents per county. Of 
6 
7 the denominations asked in 2000(2010), 149(236) responded, resulting in 
8 
9 
141.372(150.686)  million  adherents  across  all  counties,  which  constitutes  around 
11 
12 50.21%(48.78%) of the entire population in 2000(2010). While these rates might 
13 
14 
appear low, the survey captured most of the large congregations. The total reported 
16 
17 adherents  across  all counties represented 89.3% and 92.39% (for 2000 and 2010 
18 
19 
respectively) of the total adherents listed in the Yearbook of American and Canadian 
20 
21 
22 Churches (2010). Regarding potential bias in the measure, the characteristics of non- 
23 
24 respondents are not provided by ARDA, however the high level of coverage minimizes 
25 
26 
27 the influence of response bias (as explained by Dyreng et al., 2012). Our main proxy 
28 
29 of religiosity (RELj,t) measures the degree of religiosity in the county where a firm is 
30 
31 
located (Hilary and Hui, 2009). Thus, similar to prior studies (Dyreng et al., 2012; 
33 
34 Hilary and Hui, 2009), RELj,t  is a measure of religious group adherence and equals: 
35 
36 
the number of adherents reported by all denominations in the RCMS in the county (j) 
37 
38 
39 where the firm is headquartered in year (t), divided by the population of the county 
40 
41 (j). Dyreng et al., (2012) suggest that the larger the faction of the population who are 
42 
43 
44 religious  adherents,  the  greater  the  influence  of  religious  values  on  corporations 
45 
46 headquartered in the county, i.e. the higher the REL value the stronger the religious 
47 
48 
impact. In order to construct the religious adherence values for our sample years 
50 
51 between 2000 and 2010, we follow prior research (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; 
52 
53 
Dyreng et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009) and we linearly interpolate using the 
54 
55 
56 RCMS religious adherence values from 2000 and 2010 to obtain the missing values in 
57 
58 the intervening years (2003-2010). We linearly interpolate the population data based 
59 
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on  the  2000  and  2010  US  Census  Bureau  data.  Approximating  REL  through 
1 
2 interpolation linearly increases the power of our tests, which gives us the opportunity 
3 
4 
5 to study the time-series (see Hilary and Hui, 2009) rather than single year (2010) 
6 
7 properties of our setting. However, as an additional check, we clarify that our results 
8 
9 
hold when we do not interpolate REL. 
11 
12 Considering that there are many ways to measure religiosity (Hood et al., 
13 
14 
1996), we rely on The Pew Forum10 to additionally test the hypothesis based on 
16 
17 alternative  religiosity  proxies.  Accordingly,  we  employ  the  Religious  Landscape 
18 
19 
Survey  (RLS)  (for  methodology see  RLS 11 ,  2007)  which  was  conducted  in  the 
20 
21 
22 summer of 2007, employing a representative sample of 35,957 adults at state level. 
23 
24 This  survey provides data on the following four measures: a)  the importance of 
25 
26 
27 religion in people's lives (IMP), b) the frequency of attendance at worship services 
28 
29 (WOR), c) the frequency of prayer (FRP) and d) the absolute certainty of belief in 
30 
31 
God (BEL). Thus, we additionally test the hypothesis using the abovementioned 
33 
34 measures of religiosity at state level for the year 2007 only, when the survey was 
35 
36 
conducted,  by  employing  each  of  the  religiosity  measures  separately  in  every 
37 
38 
39 regression. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Control variables 
45 
46 We identify control variables by drawing upon prior literature. Following Causholli et 
47 
48 
al. (2010), we classify control variables as being related to client attributes, auditor 
49 
50 
51 attributes  and  engagement  attributes.  We  additionally  control  for  geography  and 
52 
53 demographics.  Given  that  there  are  analytical  explanations  of  control  variables 
54 
55 
56 available in the relevant literature (Bierstaker et al., 2006; Causholli et al., 2010; 
57 
58 
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Dyreng et al., 2012; Hay et al., 2006; McGuire et al., 2012), we only provide a brief 
1 
2 account of their importance here in relation to audit fee levels and operationalization. 
3 
4 
5 Firstly, we control for client variables which are demonstrated to have the 
6 
7 most substantial impact on fees, with size being the most significant (Hay et al., 
8 
9 
2006). SIZE is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Francis, 1984). 
11 
12 Current ratio (CUR) proxies liquidity, as it is also considered to be influential (Hay et 
13 
14 
al., 2006), and it is measured as current assets to current liabilities. Return on assets 
16 
17 (ROA) and LOSS are found to be significant so they are also included (Causholli et 
18 
19 
al.,  2010).  Leverage  (LEV)  is  employed  since  prior  literature  highlights  that  it 
20 
21 
22 requires consideration (Hay et al., 2006) and it is measured as total debt to total assets 
23 
24 (ibid.). Organizational complexity is controlled by the number of business segments 
25 
26 
27 (SEG)  (Gul  and  Goodwin,  2010).  BETA  is  also  suggested  as  influential  in  the 
28 
29 literature (Cobbin, 2002). Additionally, following relevant studies, we control for 
30 
31 
company  age  (AGE)  and  product  market  competition  (PMC)  (Hay  et  al.,  2006; 
33 
34 Leventis et al., 2011). AGE is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
35 
36 
years of operation.  PMC  is  measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  (H- 
37 
38 
39 index), which is defined as the sum of the square fractions of the sales of the 50 
40 
41 largest firms in any given industry. Industries are defined on the basis of their two- 
42 
43 
44 digit SIC codes. In cases where there are fewer than 50 firms in an industry, we use 
45 
46 all firms in the industry to calculate market shares, similar to Dhaliwal et al. (2011). 
47 
48 
Additionally, we control for listing status (NYSE), since prior literature suggests it is 
50 
51 influential  to  audit  risk (Causholli  et  al.,  2010). Thus,  we incorporate  a dummy 
52 
53 
variable  to  signify  NYSE  listing,  controlling  mainly  for  NASDAQ  listed  firms. 
54 
55 
56 Finally, we include litigation risk (LIT), since it is found to be of significance in prior 
57 
58 studies  (Venkataraman  et  al.,  2008).  We  measure  LIT  by  a  dummy  variable  to 
59 
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indicate the existence/non-existence of a major,12 federal legal proceeding under SEC 
1 
2 regulation S-K §229.103. 
3 
4 
5 We also control for variables associated with auditor attributes. We include 
6 
7 auditor industry specialization (SPEC) in our analysis (Francis et al., 2005; Hay et al., 
8 
9 
2006). While we operationalize this proxy as the audit firm with the highest audit fee 
11 
12 revenue13 in a particular two-digit SIC code category within a state, we further test for 
13 
14 
alternative  operationalizations  and  cut-off  points  (see  industry  specialization  and 
16 
17 sensitivity sections). Additionally, we control for engagement attributes, including the 
18 
19 
presence of a going concern qualification in the audit report (GCON) (Hay et al., 
20 
21 
22 2006).  GCON  is  measured  by  the  dummy  variable  of  going  concern/non-going 
23 
24 concern qualification (Causholli et al., 2010). We also include audit engagement in 
25 
26 
27 the busy season (FIS), conventionally measured by a December year-end (Antle et al., 
28 
29 2006). Auditor change (AUDC) is also found to be influential in the literature (Huang 
30 
31 
et al., 2009), therefore we include it in the model and employ AUDC as a dummy 
33 
34 variable to signify auditor change/no auditor change, when compared to the prior year 
35 
36 
(similar to Antle et al., 2006; Numan and Willekens, 2012). Additionally, we control 
37 
38 
39 for time and industry. 
40 
41 Prior  literature  suggests  that  religiosity  is  bound  to  geography  and  to 
42 
43 
44 demographics  (McGuire  et  al.,  2012;  Omer  et  al.,  2015).  Thus,  we  control  for 
45 
46 demographics that prior research indicates are determinants of religiosity (Hilary and 
47 
48 
Hui,  2009;  Innaccone,  1998;  McGuire  et  al.,  2012).  As  such,  we  include  state 
50 
51 population (POP) measured by the natural logarithm to control for skewness in this 
52 
53 
variable. We also include the percentage of males (MALE) and the percentage of 
54 
55 
56 minorities (MINO) in the state. We obtain the abovementioned demographics from 
57 
58 the US Census Bureau, specifically from the American Community Survey14 which 
59 
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provides yearly data. In order to control for state economic activity, considering that 
1 
2 auditing is primarily a labor-intensive activity (Lemon et al., 2000), we include the 
3 
4 
5 natural logarithm of average wage per state (WAG). We obtain this data from the US 
6 
7 Bureau of Labor Statistics15. We do, however, perform sensitivity tests employing 
8 
9 
additional demographics (see sensitivity testing, section 5). 
11 
12 Finally, we control for a firm’s location in a rural area (RUR) as prior research 
13 
14 
suggests that firms located in rural areas experience an audit fee discount (Clatworthy 
16 
17 and Peel, 2007). To consider this effect, we follow Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) 
18 
19 
and Loughran and Schultz (2005), among others, and aggregate headquarter locations 
20 
21 
22 by  metropolitan  statistical  areas  (MSAs).  Thus,  we  classify  firms  into  three 
23 
24 subsamples based on the size of the city where the firm is headquartered and its 
25 
26 
27 distance from major population and economic activity clusters. More specifically, 
28 
29 after  obtaining company headquarter  locations,  we indicate  two  groups  of  urban 
30 
31 
firms: a) firms headquartered in one of the largest MSAs of the US (i.e., New York 
33 
34 City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, 
35 
36 
Boston, Detroit, Dallas and Houston); and b) firms headquartered in an MSA with at 
37 
38 
39 least 1 million residents, as defined by the US Census. We classify as rural (RUR) 
40 
41 those firms located at least 250 kilometers away from the above (a and b) groups of 
42 
43 
44 firms and based in MSAs with less than 1 million residents. This is because prior 
45 
46 literature on urban economics provides ample evidence suggesting that distance to 
47 
48 
urban centers significantly differentiates corporations (Duranton and Puga, 2004) and 
50 
51 that the 250km criterion is a valid measure of this differentiation in the US (Francis 
52 
53 
et al., 2012). To estimate distance, we find the latitude and longitude data for each 
54 
55 
56 firm’s  headquarters  using  the   US  Census  Bureau’s  Gazetteer  city-state  files 
57 
58 (www.census.gov/geo).   We   then   compute   the   distance   between   each   firm’s 
59 
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59 
headquarters and the ten largest US metropolitan areas, including their suburbs, and 
1 
2 between each firm and the US metropolitan areas with populations of at least 1 
3 
4 
5 million.  We  employ the  following  formula  for  computing  the  distance  d(a,b)  in 
6 
7 statutory kilometers between the two points a and b as follows: 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 d(a,b) arccos[cos(a1) cos(a2 ) cos(b1) cos(b2 )  cos(a1)sin(a2 ) cos(b1)sin(b2 )  sin(a1)sin(b1)]r...............(1) 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Where: a1  and b1  are the latitudes and longitudes of the two points (expressed in 
18 
19 radians) respectively, and r denotes the radius of the earth (approximately 6,378 
20 
21 
statutory kilometers). 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 Empirical model 
28 
29 We employ OLS regression models to examine the association between religious 
30 
31 
32 adherence and audit pricing. Audit fees are measured by the natural logarithm, similar 
33 
34 to prior studies (e.g. Hay et al., 2006). Considering that audit fees are sticky over 
35 
36 
time, coefficients might be inflated due to repeated observations. Prior literature has 
38 
39 indicated the importance of estimating t-statistics on the basis of standard errors that 
40 
41 
are adjusted for hetereoskedasticity and possible correlation within a cluster (Gow et 
42 
43 
44 al.,  2010;  Petersen,  2009).  By  following  Boone  et  al.  (2015)  and  Numan  and 
45 
46 Willekens (2012) and employing Rogers’ (1993) procedure, we cluster standard errors 
47 
48 
49 by audit firms for this and all subsequent models. The functional form of the model is 
50 
51 specified as follows: 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 AFij = αo + α1 Religiosityj + α2 LITj + α3 SIZEj + α4 SEGj + α5 CUR j + α6 ROAj + 
57 
58 
α7 LEV j +α8 BETAj + α9 LOSSj + α10 AGEj+ α11 NYSEj + α12 PMC j + 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
23  
14 
34 
51 
56 
α13AUDCj + α14FISj   + α15SPECj + α16GCONJ + α17RUR J + α18POPJ + 
1 
2 
3 α19MALEJ + α20MINOJ + α21AGEJ + j YEARS j  + 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 j INDUSTRIES j 
9 
10 
11 
12 
+ u j (2) 
13 
Definitions of all variables in equation 2 are provided in Table 1. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 Table 2 presents the descriptives of county religiosity. Panel A shows values from the 
25 
26 2000 and 2010 RCMS, which are the values we use to interpolate our sample data 
27 
28 
29 points. The mean(median) value of religious  adherence per capita in  our sample 
30 
31 counties is 51%(50.4%) and 49.5%(48.5%) in 2000 and 2010 respectively – which is 
32 
33 
very similar to the national rates. The 2000 and 2010 data for county-level adherence 
35 
36 is highly persistent, with a correlation of 0.75. In Panel B of Table 1, we compare the 
37 
38 
ten most religious and ten least religious states based on the counties in our sample. 
39 
40 
41 For the purpose of comparison with prior literature: of their top ten most religious 
42 
43 states, Dyreng et al. (2012) list 6 in common with our study, McGuire et al. (2012) list 
44 
45 
46 5 and Hilary and Hui (2009) also list 5. Six of our least religious states are also ranked 
47 
48 in the bottom 10 by Dyreng et al. (2012), 6 by McGuire et al. (2012) and 9 by Hilary 
49 
50 
and Hui (2009). Considering that we have different sample compositions to these 
52 
53 studies, and that our religiosity proxy is based on the more up-to-date RCMS 2010 
54 
55 
dataset, we trust that our classification of states is reasonable. Figure 1 depicts the 
57 
58 religiosity measures of US states based on our sample, ranging from the most “pious” 
59 
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state of Utah down to the state of Nevada, where most companies are headquartered 
1 
2 in the “sin” city of Las Vegas (Clark County). 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
8 
9 
10 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
To reduce the effect of any outliers, we winsorize all continuous model variables at 
17 
18 the 1st  and 99th  percentiles of their respective  distributions. Table 3 presents the 
19 
20 
summary statistics of the variables used. The mean(median) of the main dependent 
21 
22 
23 variable is 13.85(13.92), similar to prior studies (see Gul and Goodwin, 2010; Numan 
24 
25 and Willekens, 2012). The mean(median) of REL is .520(.527) and is very close to 
26 
27 
28 values  reported  by  Dyreng  et  al.,  (2012).  The  mean(median)  of  the  other  main 
29 
30 independent variables are .551 (.540) for IMP, .385(.370) for WOR, .567(.560) for 
31 
32 
FRP  and  finally  .703(.710)  for  BEL;  suggesting  that  most  interviewees  declare 
34 
35 absolute belief in God but less of them declare worship attendance (WOR). The 
36 
37 
means of CUR, ROA and LEV are 2.06%, 2.55% and 27.33% respectively, indicating 
38 
39 
40 that our sample firms are not particularly liquid, profitable or leveraged and these 
41 
42 findings are similar to  prior studies (see Gul and Goodwin, 2010).  Additionally, 
43 
44 
45 around  6%  of  firms  changed  auditors  from  prior  years  (identical  to  Numan  and 
46 
47 Willekens, 2012), while around 67% report a year end on 31 December, which is 
48 
49 
50 higher than the value reported by Fung et al. (2012). Finally, around 20% of our 
51 
52 sample firms have been involved in a major litigation, which is close to the value 
53 
54 
reported by Antle et al. (2006) for their industry-based litigation measure. 
56 
57 Table 4 and Table 5 present the two-tailed p-values of the Pearson correlation 
58 
59 
tests between the regression variables. AF is significantly correlated with REL with a 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
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55 
negative sign. Almost all variables are correlated significantly with AF, with SIZE 
1 
2 exhibiting the highest p-value. Other inferences suggest that multicollinearity is not a 
3 
4 
5 serious problem (Gujarati, 1995). Hilary and Hui (2009) find that firms headquartered 
6 
7 in religious counties invest less in risky projects, which results in higher profitability. 
8 
9 
Our  data  support  these  relationships  since  we  find  that  firms  located  in  areas 
11 
12 characterized by higher religiosity have a higher ROA, fewer incidences of past losses 
13 
14 
(LOSS) and a lower BETA. Given that these variables are significantly correlated 
16 
17 with AF, and in order to draw more conclusive inferences considering the effect of 
18 
19 
religiosity  on  audit  pricing  (since  univariate  comparisons  do  not  control  for 
20 
21 
22 confounding factors), we employ a multivariate analysis so as to hold these correlated 
23 
24 factors constant. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
30 
31 
32 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Empirical results 
39 
40 Religious adherence and audit fees 
41 
42 The  regression  results  are  summarized  in  Table  5.  All  regression  models  are 
43 
44 
45 significant at 1%, with explanatory powers of around 83%. The coefficients of all 
46 
47 religiosity measures (REL, IMP, WOR, FRP and BEL) are negative and all significant 
48 
49 
50 at 1%. This suggests that, no matter how religiosity is measured (i.e., percentage of 
51 
52 religious adherents in local counties for REL; interviewee perceptions for IMP, WOR, 
53 
54 
FRP and BEL), audit firms charge significantly less to firms located in more religious 
56 
57 areas. If we focus on the main model (REL) and we interpret the coefficients as 
58 
59 
elasticities, we find that an increase of REL by 1% will provide a decrease in audit 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
26  
13 
19 
36 
58 
fees by around 22%, ( ), i.e. an average decrease of $560,00016 
1 
2 per year per firm. While this amount is economically material in absolute terms, it is 
3 
4 
5 also considerable regarding the projections of enhanced religiosity levels in the US in 
6 
7 the foreseeable future (see Newport, 2012). 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
The regression coefficients of the control variables are consistent with the expected 
20 
21 signs based on prior research, except for ROA and FIS. Specifically, for the REL 
22 
23 
model the significance for client variables suggests that SIZE, complexity (SEG), 
24 
25 
26 liquidity (CUR) and risk (BETA, LEV, NYSE, LOSS) have a significant association 
27 
28 with audit pricing (similar to Causholli et al., 2010; Hay et al., 2006). LEV has a 
29 
30 
31 significant negative sign, tentatively suggesting that lenders carry out a monitoring 
32 
33 role, verifying the expectations raised by Jensen and Meckling (1976). LIT has a 
34 
35 
significant and positive sign, similar to prior studies (e.g. Antle et al., 2006) which 
37 
38 suggest  that  litigation  is  an  important  element  of  the  inherent  risk  that  auditors 
39 
40 
consider when organizing and executing the audit (see Hay et al., 2006). PMC has a 
41 
42 
43 significant positive coefficient, suggesting that at higher levels of product market 
44 
45 competition the monitoring costs of audit scrutiny are reduced, probably because 
46 
47 
48 owners can place some reliance on the product market scrutiny of management by 
49 
50 competitors  (Leventis  et  al.,  2011).  SPEC  is  significant  with  a  positive  sign, 
51 
52 
53 suggesting that when audit firms manage to dominate in a market sector they demand 
54 
55 and receive fee premiums, which is similar to prior literature on audit specialization 
56 
57 
(Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005). Additionally, difficulties related to audit 
59 
60 engagements, as suggested by the significance of GCON and AUDC, are significant 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
27  
10 
15 
32 
for  the  determination  of  audit  fees  (similar  to  Hay  et  al.,  2006).  The  negative 
1 
2 coefficient  of  AUDC  requires  some  further  investigation  to  verify  whether  low- 
3 
4 
5 balling takes place, i.e. whether auditors provide fee discounts in initial engagements 
6 
7 to attract new clients, followed by fee recovery in the future while still retaining the 
8 
9 
client (DeAngelo, 1981). AGE is not significant, similar to Caramanis and Lennox 
11 
12 (2008). The coefficients of demographic controls are in line with expectations and all 
13 
14 
make economic sense. Interestingly, the coefficient of RUR is significant at 1% and 
16 
17 WAG is also significant. This suggests that audit fee premiums previously attributed 
18 
19 
exclusively to cost-related factors in urban areas (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007) might 
20 
21 
22 require further investigation. The significance of control variables for the IMP, WOR, 
23 
24 FRP and BEL models are overall very similar and also do not materially deviate from 
25 
26 
27 the  above-discussed  findings  regarding  the  REL  model.  Specifically,  all  control 
28 
29 variables share similarities in signs and significance except CUR, LEV, CGON and 
30 
31 
WAG, which are significant only for the REL model; while AGE and MINO are 
33 
34 significant only for the IMP, WOR, FRP and BEL models. 
35 
36 
Overall, our results support prior literature and demonstrate that audit pricing 
37 
38 
39 is affected by client, auditor and audit-engagement characteristics. They also indicate, 
40 
41 however, that previously-developed audit fee models (e.g. Bierstaker et al., 2006) 
42 
43 
44 should pay additional attention to external factors and, in particular, the intensity of 
45 
46 religious adherence. 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 Extensions 
52 
53 
While we provide empirical evidence that religious adherence is associated with a 
54 
55 
56 significant audit fee discount, we further extend our investigation on two fronts. First, 
57 
58 we examine whether the impact  of religion  still  holds when measures  of spatial 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
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54 
competition are introduced, since recent evidence suggests that audit fees are affected 
1 
2 by an auditor’s relative location within a market segment (Numan and Willekens, 
3 
4 
5 2012). Second, we investigate whether the impact of religion is different across levels 
6 
7 of auditor industry expertise, since prior literature suggests that audit firms with 
8 
9 
industry expertise differ in terms of audit pricing and audit quality (Huang et al., 
11 
12 2007; Reichelt and Wang, 2010). 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 Audit spatial competition 
18 
19 
Considering a differentiated product market perspective (e.g. Hotelling, 1929; Tirole, 
20 
21 
22 1988), Numan and Willekens (2012) provide evidence suggesting that audit fees 
23 
24 increase when there is considerable alignment between auditor and client, and when 
25 
26 
27 the distance between the auditor and the closest competitor is greater. Thus, we 
28 
29 examine to what extent our religiosity results hold when an auditor’s relative industry 
30 
31 
and geographical location in a market segment is introduced. Following Numan and 
33 
34 Willekens (2012), we operationalize auditor-client alignment as the industry portfolio 
35 
36 
share (IPS) within an audit market (i.e. a 2-digit SIC industry within a US MSA). 
37 
38 
39 Additionally,  we operationalize  auditor-competitor  distance  (DIS)  as  the  smallest 
40 
41 absolute fee market share between the auditor and their closest competitor within an 
42 
43 
44 audit market. Similarly to Numan and Willekens (ibid.), we include in our model the 
45 
46 effect  of  concentration  within  an  audit  market,  measured  by  the  Herfindahl 
47 
48 
concentration index (HER) per audit market, which is calculated as 
50 
51 where: i is an audit office in an audit market and s is the market share in 
52 
53 
an audit market based on audit fees. We also control for industry specialization effects 
55 
56 at  the  national  level,  similar  to  Numan  and  Willekens  (ibid.),  as  prior  evidence 
57 
58 
suggests  that  national-specific  industry  expertise  is  priced  (DeFond  et  al.,  2000; 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
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Huang et al., 2007). Thus, we include ISPN which is the fees an audit firm generates 
1 
2 in a 2-digit SIC industry as a percentage of the total fees generated by the average 
3 
4 
5 audit firm nationwide. 
6 
7 An issue which initially provided us with some concern is the high correlation 
8 
9 
between HER and DIS (see Table 3), although this correlation between HER and DIS 
11 
12 is  not  as  high  as  in  the  model  by  Numan  and  Willekens  (2012).  Nevertheless, 
13 
14 
considering that the VIF of the model is not extremely high (6.2), and for reasons of 
16 
17 comparability with  Numan  and  Willekens  (ibid.),  we  keep  it  in  the  model.  The 
18 
19 
regression results are reported in Table 6. Initially, we find that IPS and DIS are 
20 
21 
22 significant  at  1%  with  the  expected  positive  sign.  This  supports  Numan  and 
23 
24 Willekens’ results (ibid.), suggesting that their findings hold for a wider time frame 
25 
26 
27 (2003-2010). The negative sign of the DIS x IPS interaction is also similar to Numan 
28 
29 and Willekens (ibid.). However, the significant coefficient suggests that DIS and IPS 
30 
31 
are dependent on each other to some extent. When REL and control demographics are 
33 
34 included in the model, REL is significant at 1% with the expected negative sign, 
35 
36 
suggesting that religiosity remains significant in a spatial competition framework. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 Auditor industry expertise 
48 
49 Prior  literature  has  indicated  that  industry  expertise  premiums  contribute  to  the 
50 
51 
structure of audit fees (Huang et al., 2007; Reichelt and Wang, 2010) and thus the 
53 
54 relevant effects need to be investigated (Fung et al., 2012). Prior evidence, however, 
55 
56 
has indicated that proxy determination of auditor expertise is crucial. This is because 
57 
58 
59 prior studies measuring auditor expertise at a national level have provided mixed 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
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results.  For example,  while Palmrose (1986) and Francis  et al. (2005) report no 
1 
2 expertise premium, contrary to the findings of Castarella et al. (2004) and Huang et al. 
3 
4 
5 (2007), some others provide only limited support (e.g. Ferguson and Stokes, 2002). 
6 
7 Interestingly, some relatively more recent studies have shifted the attention to a more 
8 
9 
geographically-restricted auditor industry expertise proxy, based on the rationale that 
11 
12 the primary audit work and decision making involving clients occurs at local offices 
13 
14 
(Francis  et  al.,  2005).  Indeed,  these  studies  report  strong  evidence  for  auditor 
16 
17 expertise premiums (Carson and Fargher, 2007; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 
18 
19 
2005; Fung et al., 2012). 
20 
21 
22 Against this background, we initially examine whether the impact of religion 
23 
24 is different across different levels of auditor industry expertise, i.e. we test whether 
25 
26 
27 the bargaining power of auditor expertise, as clearly documented in prior literature 
28 
29 (Casterella  et  al.,  2004;  Mayhew  and  Wilkins,  2003),  moderates  the  effects  of 
30 
31 
religiosity. Thus, we split the sample into firms that have auditors with industry 
33 
34 market  expertise  versus  those  with  no  industry  expertise.  We  consider  industry 
35 
36 
expertise as the audit firm with the largest audit fee market share in a 2-digit SIC 
37 
38 
39 industry in a particular state. Additionally, we test whether differential definitions of 
40 
41 industry  expertise  influence  the  strength  of  our  results.  Thus,  we  define  auditor 
42 
43 
44 expertise
17 at national, MSA and county levels and run the model again. We conduct a 
45 
46 further sensitivity test to see whether cut-off points for the determination of industry 
47 
48 
expertise play a role (see section 5). The results are reported in Table 7. 
50 
51 
52 
53 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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Considering that the coefficients of REL remain significant at the 1% level in both 
1 
2 (expert vs. non-expert) groups, we conclude that our initial results do not differ based 
3 
4 
5 on levels of industry expertise. Additionally, the REL coefficient remains significant 
6 
7 at 1%, which suggests that our results hold irrespectively of auditor-expertise proxy 
8 
9 
determination. Interestingly, the coefficient of expertise (SPEC) becomes stronger as 
11 
12 we move from national to county level, suggesting that local segmentation might be a 
13 
14 
driving force behind audit fee determination. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Sensitivity analysis on main results 
20 
21 
22 In developing our hypothesis on the relation between religiosity and audit pricing, we 
23 
24 base  our  rationale  on  previous  researchers  who  demonstrate  that  religiosity  is 
25 
26 
27 associated with lower levels of financial misstatement. However, to test whether this 
28 
29 holds in our sample, we rely on the McGuire et al. (2012) model and examine whether 
30 
31 
religiosity   is   negatively   associated   with   measures   of   earnings   management, 
33 
34 accounting  risk  and  the  likelihood  of  restatement.  Specifically,  we  employ  the 
35 
36 
Dechow  et  al.  (1995)  and  Kothari  et  al.  (2005)  models  to  measure  earnings 
37 
38 
39 management  while  we  rely  on  Audit  Integrity’s  accounting  risk  (AR)  measure 
40 
41 developed by GMI (www.gmiratings.com), which has been used by various prior 
42 
43 
44 studies (e.g. McGuire et al., 2012) to measure accounting risk. Our results suggest that 
45 
46 religiosity does indeed have a significantly negative coefficient in relation to all these 
47 
48 
measures, i.e. the level of religious adherence is negatively associated with levels of 
50 
51 financial misstatement in our sample as well. 
52 
53 
We further consider the robustness of our results in a number of different 
54 
55 
56 ways. Firstly, following Grullon et al. (2010) and Dyreng et al. (2012), we run an 
57 
58 alternative proxy of religiosity (developed by RCMS) measured as: the number of 
59 
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churches  reported  by  all  congregations  in  the  county  (j)  where  the  firm  is 
1 
2 headquartered in year (t), divided by the population of the county (j), times 1,000. Our 
3 
4 
5 inferences remain the same. Secondly, we test whether our results hold for a single 
6 
7 year of our sample, to ensure that our results do not depend on the interpolation of our 
8 
9 
religiosity data across multiple years (McGuire et al., 2012). We limit the sample to 
11 
12 2010 (for the most recent RMCS data) and run our primary tests again, similar to 
13 
14 
Dyreng et al. (2012). We find similar results. 
16 
17 Thirdly, since audit fees are determined, to some extent, by negotiations with 
18 
19 
auditors, it is likely that our results are partially driven by auditor religiosity. To 
20 
21 
22 examine whether our results are driven by auditor religiosity, we employ a subsample 
23 
24 of auditors and clients that are not located in the same MSAs. In our sample, 27.30% 
25 
26 
27 of auditors are located in different MSAs than their clients, while auditor and client 
28 
29 religiosity are highly correlated (.652) at the 1% level of significance. Thus, we run 
30 
31 
the REL regression again considering auditor religiosity. Results are consistent with 
33 
34 those in Table 5. Specifically, the coefficient on the REL is negative and significant at 
35 
36 
1%. 
37 
38 
39 Fourthly, we test for sensitivity with a battery of variables that have been 
40 
41 found or suggested (explicitly or implicitly) to influence audit pricing but are not 
42 
43 
44 included in our full model due to data and/or specification reasons. Thus, we test non- 
45 
46 audit fees (NAF) and the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEE) (Causholli et al., 
47 
48 
2010). NAF is significant with a positive sign while FEE is significant with a negative 
50 
51 sign. We also test international sales to turnover (FOR) and the number of subsidiaries 
52 
53 
(NS) (Hay et al., 2006). These are both significant with a positive sign. Additionally, 
54 
55 
56 we test the effect of: book to market (Cobbin, 2002); membership of the Fortune 500 
57 
58 index  (Kedia  and  Rajgopal,  2011);  and  research  and  development  to  turnover 
59 
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(RandD)   (Gul   and   Goodwin,   2010);   all   of   which   are   non-significant.   The 
1 
2 incorporation of all the above variables does not change our inferences. 
3 
4 
5 Additionally,  we  test  for  the  auditor’s  assessment  of  internal  controls 
6 
7 efficiency  (Gul  and  Goodwin,  2010).  We  use  a  dummy,  obtained  from  Audit 
8 
9 
Analytics,  to  indicate  efficient/inefficient  internal  controls.  We  find  that  the 
11 
12 inefficiency  of  internal  controls  significantly  increases  audit  fees  (at  the  1% 
13 
14 
significance level), probably due to the increased audit risk and/or because auditors 
16 
17 undertake some extra relevant tasks, while the REL coefficient remains significant at 
18 
19 
1%. We also test for additional demographic and geographic controls. Accordingly, 
20 
21 
22 we include: educational attainment (EDU), defined as the percentage of people in the 
23 
24 state who are 25  years or over and have a bachelor’s degree; the percentage of 
25 
26 
27 married people in the state (MAR); and the average state income (INC) (Hilary and 
28 
29 Hui, 2009; Innaccone, 1998). Again, our inferences remain unchanged. 
30 
31 
Moreover, we control for state judicial quality, since the quality and integrity 
33 
34 of the judicial system may influence managerial and auditor decisions (Kedia and 
35 
36 
Rajgopal, 2011). We operationalize state judicial quality (SJQ) using the overall state 
37 
38 
39 ranking reported in the 2001 State Liabilities Rankings Study which was conducted 
40 
41 for the US Chamber of Commerce18 (2002). SJQ is not found to be significant, while 
42 
43 
44 the significance of the REL coefficient remains unchanged. 
45 
46 We also control for corporations headquartered in states that have 
47 
48 
implemented the education requirement of the 150-hour rule19 (R150), since it has 
50 
51 been suggested to influence audit price determination (Allen and Woodland, 2010). 
52 
53 
Indeed, R150 is significant at the 1% level, while REL remains significant at 1%. 
54 
55 
56 Additionally, we re-estimate our results in Table 5 using county-level measures for 
57 
58 population, average wage and audit specialization. Our inferences remain unchanged. 
59 
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Fifthly,  endogeneity  is  always  a  potential  concern  when  data  are  cross- 
1 
2 sectional. In this project, however, endogeneity may be limited to correlated omitted 
3 
4 
5 variables rather than reverse causality. It is highly unlikely that levels of audit fees 
6 
7 cause companies to change headquarters, since firms relocate only rarely (see Pirinsky 
8 
9 
and Wang, 2006), or that they lead people to change religious adherence. So, we 
11 
12 consider the REL variable as exogenous to audit pricing. Nevertheless, we account for 
13 
14 
variables that could conceptually be correlated to both REL and audit pricing. 
16 
17 For this reason, we examine the effect of the prevailing political values in the 
18 
19 
geographical  areas  (Rubbin,  2008),  which  have  been  suggested  to  determine 
20 
21 
22 economic (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011), accounting (Dyreng et al., 2012) and audit 
23 
24 outcomes (Leventis et al., 2013). We operationalize POLj,t through a dummy, coded 1 
25 
26 
27 where election results favor Republican candidates, and 0 where the election results 
28 
29 favor Democratic candidates in the county (j) where firms are headquartered in year 
30 
31 
(t). When POL is included in the model, the REL coefficient remains at the same level 
33 
34 of significance. 
35 
36 
We also examine the impact of financial misstatement on audit pricing. While 
37 
38 
39 there are regulatory and market concerns regarding the relationship between audit 
40 
41 pricing   and   measures   of   financial   misstatement,   empirical   literature   is   still 
42 
43 
44 inconclusive  with  regard  to  the  direction  of  the  relationship  (see  Larcker  and 
45 
46 Richardson, 2004). Thus, for sensitivity reasons, we test whether the inclusion of 
47 
48 
proxies of financial misstatement have any disproportionate effects on our results by 
50 
51 including  academically-  and  commercially-developed  measures.  Specifically,  we 
52 
53 
employ academically-developed proxies (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005) 
54 
55 
56 and Audit Integrity’s accounting risk (AR) measure. However, our results remain 
57 
58 unchanged. 
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In addition, we look at the effect of ownership structure since prior studies 
1 
2 demonstrate that this can affect audit pricing (e.g. Khalil et al., 2008). Kumar et al. 
3 
4 
5 (2011) suggest that companies headquartered in more religious areas might share 
6 
7 particular characteristics in terms of ownership structure. We therefore include two 
8 
9 
additional  variables  to  measure  institutional  and  insider  ownership.  We  measure 
11 
12 institutional  ownership  as  the  percentage  of  total  shares  outstanding  held  by 
13 
14 
organizations, companies, universities and other groups that have greater than $100 
16 
17 million in equity assets. We measure insider ownership as the percentage of the total 
18 
19 
number of common stock outstanding held by corporate insiders. Officers, directors, 
20 
21 
22 and beneficial owners are only included if they hold at least 1,000 shares. We also 
23 
24 examine the interaction between religiosity and ownership structure variables. In all 
25 
26 
27 the abovementioned tests, the coefficient of religiosity remains significant at 1%, 
28 
29 while the interactions are not significant. 
30 
31 
Sixthly, while we define auditor expertise, similar to prior studies (Ferguson et 
33 
34 al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005), as the audit firm with the largest audit fee market share 
35 
36 
in a 2-digit SIC industry, we also sensitivity test for alternative definitions. Thus, we 
37 
38 
39 run the models again by including specialization when an audit firm has a fee market 
40 
41 share of at least 25% (or 30% in a 2-digit SIC industry), similar to prior studies (e.g. 
42 
43 
44 Numan and Willekens, 2012). Our results remain unchanged. We also test whether 
45 
46 religiosity plays any role in the determination of the FEE variable (non-audit fees to 
47 
48 
total fees). Indeed, in this case, REL has a significant negative coefficient. 
50 
51 Finally, we estimate a median regression (minimizing the sum of absolute 
52 
53 
errors instead of squared errors) to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers. 
54 
55 
56 However, the REL coefficient remains significant at 1%. 
57 
58 
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Conclusions 
1 
2 In this paper, we examine whether religiosity affects audit pricing levels. In particular, 
3 
4 
5 we test whether audit firms follow different audit fee policies in the case of firms 
6 
7 headquartered in US counties characterized by high religious adherence. We draw 
8 
9 
upon  recent  literature  that  documents  how  religiosity  operates  as  a  monitoring 
11 
12 institution  which  reduces  managerial  slackness  and  corporate  irregularities,  and 
13 
14 
enhances accountability and transparency in financial reporting (Dyreng et al., 2012; 
16 
17 McGuire et al., 2012). Bearing this in mind, we examine whether firms headquartered 
18 
19 
in more religious areas experience significant audit pricing adjustments by employing 
20 
21 
22 a sample of 1,272 US-listed firms for an eight-year period (2003-2010). On the 
23 
24 basis of social norm theory and Simunic’s (1980) seminal work, which drew attention 
25 
26 
27 to the resource component and the expected loss component of the audit fees model, 
28 
29 we demonstrate that religiosity, at firm-level, mitigates audit costs (related resource 
30 
31 
and/or expected loss components) which results in reduced audit fees. Furthermore, 
33 
34 we find that the impact of religiosity on auditor pricing decisions is not differentiated 
35 
36 
by levels of auditor expertise. We also provide evidence that audit fees are determined 
37 
38 
39 by  the  auditor’s  relative  location  in  the  market  sector  (similar  to  Numan  and 
40 
41 Willekens, 2012) and the auditor’s level of religious adherence. 
42 
43 
44 Our  study provides  several  contributions.  Firstly,  our  findings  extend  the 
45 
46 literature and further understandings of the determinants of audit pricing by testing the 
47 
48 
impact of religiosity on audit fees. While prior literature on audit fees has focused on 
50 
51 company-  and/or  audit-specific  variables  (see  for  instance  Beattie  et  al.,  2001, 
52 
53 
Bierstaker et al., 2006; Hay et al., 2006), we show that audit pricing is significantly 
54 
55 
56 driven by an external factor related to religious adherence that lies beyond managerial 
57 
58 or  auditor  control.  Secondly,  we  demonstrate  that,  since  in  religious  contexts 
59 
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managers develop risk-averse and conservative attitudes which lead to less corporate 
1 
2 investment risk, auditors assess such client contexts as less risky and plan audit 
3 
4 
5 processes accordingly – which reduces the fees charged. Therefore, we show that 
6 
7 religiosity operates as a substitutive control mechanism to auditing, extending the 
8 
9 
newly-established branch of literature on the importance of religiosity in relation to 
11 
12 financial reporting processes (Callen and Fang, 2015; Hilary and Hui, 2009; McGuire 
13 
14 
et al., 2012). Thirdly, we provide evidence that the impact of religiosity on auditor 
16 
17 pricing  decisions  is  not  differentiated  in  relation  to  levels  of  auditor  expertise. 
18 
19 
Moreover, we show that audit fees are simultaneously determined by the auditor’s 
20 
21 
22 relative location in a market segment and by the level of religiosity in the corporate 
23 
24 location. 
25 
26 
27 The implications  of our  results  are important  for  regulators,  shareholders, 
28 
29 managers and auditors since we demonstrate that the different levels of religious 
30 
31 
adherence across various counties are related to differential audit pricing policies. 
33 
34 Thus, a constitutive element of corporate agency costs, namely audit fees, is shown to 
35 
36 
oscillate   in   association   with   the   intensity  of   the   religious   adherence   which 
37 
38 
39 characterizes  the  geographical  area  within  which  firms  are  headquartered.  The 
40 
41 substitutive role of religiosity might also be a factor to take into consideration when 
42 
43 
44 relevant attempts to regulate or increase levels of accounting quality are made (see 
45 
46 Guiso   et   al.,   2006).   Moreover,   market   participants   (in   particular   investors, 
47 
48 
shareholders and analysts) should be aware that, ceteris paribus, in highly religious 
50 
51 counties agency costs are significantly reduced, which may add a new perspective to 
52 
53 
investment strategies and financial reporting analyses. 
54 
55 
56 We note, however, some limitations to our research. We acknowledge that the 
57 
58 particular research design adopted has certain limitations. By focusing on the location 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
38  
10 
15 
of  corporate  headquarters  and  the  level  of  religiosity  geographically,  we  do  not 
1 
2 actually measure the individual religiosity of managers or auditors. Therefore, we are 
3 
4 
5 not in a position to rule out the possibility that our results may be partially driven by 
6 
7 individual  beliefs.  In  this  light,  further  investigation  is  required  by  employing 
8 
9 
alternative  tools  such  as  (electronic  or  mail)  surveys  and  interviews  to  measure 
11 
12 aspects of individual religiosity, i.e. belief, practice, formal membership, informal 
13 
14 
affiliation, ritual initiation, doctrinal knowledge, moral sense and core values. Such 
16 
17 approaches  might  provide  additional  insights  into  the  religiosity-audit  pricing 
18 
19 
relationship. Moreover, since our study is restricted to the US, our findings are limited 
20 
21 
22 to the specific geographical borders and thereby may not be generalizable. Future 
23 
24 researchers  could  employ  cross-country  samples  to  run  the  tests  and  models 
25 
26 
27 introduced in this study in order to produce more generalizable results. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
1 
2 
3 
Dependent variable 
5 
6 AF natural logarithm of audit fees 
7 
8 
Independent variables – Religiosity measures 
9 
10 
11 REL number of adherents in the county in which the firm is headquartered, 
12 as reported by the RMCS 2000 and 2010 studies, divided by the 
13 county population as per the US Census 
14 IMP importance of religion, based on the US Religious Landscape Survey 
16 WOR worship attendance frequency, based on the US Religious Landscape 
17 Survey 
18 FRP frequency of prayer, based on the US Religious Landscape Survey 
19 BEL belief in God, based on the US Religious Landscape Survey 
20 
21 
22 Control variables 
23 
24 SIZE natural logarithm of total assets 
25 LIT dummy coded 1 if a firm has material legal proceedings, 0 otherwise 
27 SEG natural logarithm of number of business segments 
28 CUR ratio of current assets to total assets 
29 ROA return on total assets 
30 LEV ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
31 BETA market risk, relationship between stock volatility and the market 
33 volatility 
34 LOSS dummy coded 1 if a firm’s net income in prior year is < 0, 0 otherwise 
35 AGE natural logarithm of company age 
36 NYSE dummy coded 1 if a firm is listed on the NYSE, 0 otherwise 
37 
38 PMC product market competition 
39 AUDC dummy coded 1 if the auditor changed compared to prior year, 0 
40 otherwise 
41 FIS dummy coded 1 if fiscal year end is in December, 0 otherwise 
42 SPEC dummy coded 1 if the audit firm owns the largest fee market share in 
44 an audit market, 0 otherwise. An audit market is defined as a 2-digit 
45 SIC industry in a county. 
46 GCON dummy  coded  1  if  a  firm  has  a  going  concern  qualification,  0 
47 otherwise 
48 
49 RUR dummy coded 1 if a firm is headquartered in an rural area, 0 otherwise 
50 POP natural logarithm of population per state 
51 MALE ratio of male population to state population 
52 MINO ratio of minority population to state population 
53 WAG natural logarithm of average wage per state 
55 IPS fees an audit firm generates in a 2-digit SIC industry as a percentage 
56 of the total fees generated by an audit firm in a US Metropolitan 
57 Statistical Area (MSA) 
58 DIS smallest absolute fee market share difference between the incumbent 
59 auditor and their closest competitor in an audit market. An audit 
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4 
market is defined as a 2-digit SIC industry in an MSA 
1 HER Herfindahl concentration index per audit market. The Herfindahl 
2 index is calculated as where i is an audit office in an 
3 audit market, and s is the market share in an audit market based on 
5 audit fees. 
6 IPSN fees an audit firm generates in a 2-digit SIC industry as a percentage 
7   of the total fees generated by an audit firm nationwide   
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Table 2: County Religiosity (REL) Descriptive Statistics 
1 
 
 2 
Panel A: Religious adherence in the Religious Congregations and Membership Study 
3 
4 (RCMS)  for  years  2000  and  2010  for  the  335  counties  where  sample  firm 
5 headquarters reside 
6 
7 Year N Mean St. Dev P50 
8 
2000 335 0.510 0.126 0.504 
10 2010 335 0.495 0.125 0.485 
11 
12 
13 
14 Panel B: Ten most and ten least religious (REL) states 
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Rank 
 
 
State 
Weighted Average 
(by County Population) 
Religious Adherence by State 
1 Utah 0.828 
2 North Dakota 0.688 
3 Oklahoma 0.683 
4 Mississippi 0.630 
5 Massachusetts 0.621 
6 South Dakota 0.614 
7 Illinois 0.581 
8 New Jersey 0.575 
9 Idaho 0.570 
10 Louisiana 0.563 
.  . 
.  . 
.  . 
39 Wyoming 0.408 
40 West Virginia 0.399 
41 Vermont 0.396 
42 Colorado 0.378 
43 Alaska 0.359 
44 Oregon 0.339 
45 Washington 0.331 
46 Maine 0.326 
47 Arizona 0.303 
48 Nevada 0.294 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
1 
2 
N Mean StDev Min Median Max 
3 
4 
5 Dependent Variable 
6 AF 10,176 13.85 1.40 8.55 13.92 18.23 
7 AF in $ (,000) 10,176 2,545.00 4,384.00 5.20 1,112.00 83,334.00 
8 
9 
10 Independent Variables 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 Variables are described in Table 1 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
REL 10,176 .520 .106 .199 .527 .913 
IMP 1,272 .551 .091 .360 .540 .600 
WOR 1,272 .385 .071 .220 .370 .600 
FRP 1,272 .567 .078 .400 .560 .770 
BEL 1,272 .703 .073 .540 .710 .910 
Control Variables 
SIZE 
 
10,176 
 
6.59 
 
2.31 
 
3.75 
 
6.78 
 
12.61 
LIT 10,176 .205 .404 0 0 1 
SEG 10,176 .755 .702 0 .895 2.30 
CUR 10,176 2.06 1.50 .002 1.69 14.54 
ROA(%) 10,176 2.55 10.66 -49.90 4.139 48.92 
LEV(%) 10,176 27.33 20.73 1.01 24.34 149.98 
BETA 10,176 1.26 .794 .19 1.20 8.94 
LOSS 10,176 .254 .435 0 0 1 
AGE 10,176 3.19 .871 0 3.13 5.26 
NYSE 10,176 .518 .499 0 1 1 
PMC 10,176 .072 .076 .010 .043 .412 
AUDC 10,176 .062 .242 0 0 1 
FIS 10,176 .673 .468 0 1 1 
SPEC 10,176 .050 .219 0 0 1 
GCON 10,176 .032 .176 0 0 1 
RUR 10,176 .375 .484 0 0 1 
POP 10,176 16.10 .842 8.92 13.09 17.43 
MALE 10,176 .491 .006 .480 .490 .520 
MINO 10,176 .244 .090 .020 .250 .760 
WAG 10,176 10.67 .160 9.95 10.20 11.01 
IPS 10,176 .391 .276 .001 .321 .911 
DIS 10,176 .368 .283 .001 .372 .985 
HER 10,176 .558 .192 .110 .525 .996 
IPSN 10,176 .081 .045 .001 .085 .095 
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Matrixes 
Panel A: Pearson correlation matrix between AF, REL and control variables (n = 10,176) 
AF 
1.000 
REL SIZE LIT SEG CUR ROA LEV BETA LOSS AGE NYSE PMC AUDC FIS SPEC GCON RUR POP MALE MINO WAG IPS DIS HER IPSN 
-0.03* 1.000                         
0.87* -0.02 1.000                        
0.36* -0.01 0.36* 1.000                       
0.43* 0.02 0.38* 0.12* 1.000                      
-0.15* -0.02* -0.17* -0.07* -0.12* 1.000                     
0.18* 0.02* 0.25* 0.06* 0.09* -0.05* 1.000                    
-0.01 -0.03* 0.03* -0.02* -0.02* -0.22* -0.17* 1.000                   
0.06* -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.03* 0.06* -0.13* 0.03* 1.000                  
-0.26* -0.02* -0.36* -0.06* -0.16* 0.06* -0.57* 0.17* 0.13* 1.000                 
0.20* -0.01 0.19* 0.06* 0.19* -0.04* 0.12* -0.12* -0.06* -0.15* 1.000                
0.57* 0.05* 0.55* 0.19* 0.33* -0.21* 0.20* 0.03* 0.01* -0.28* 0.18* 1.000               
0.02* 0.01 0.05* -0.01 -0.02* -0.04* 0.07* -0.01 0.03* -0.08* 0.02 0.04* 1.000              
-0.18* 0.01 -0.19* -0.04* -0.06* 0.02* -0.07* 0.02 0.01 0.09* -0.04* -0.12* -0.02* 1.000             
0.09* -0.01 0.09* 0.02* 0.11* -0.04* -0.02* 0.13* 0.01 0.01* -0.09* 0.10* -0.08* 0.01 1.000            
0.20* -0.02* 0.19* 0.11* 0.05* -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.04* -0.01 -0.02* 0.10* 0.15* -0.05* 0.02* 1.000           
0.28* 0.01 -0.37* -0.05* -0.13* -0.13* -0.22* 0.14* -0.04* 0.28* -0.07* -0.17* -0.06* 0.09* 0.01 -0.03* 1.000          
-0.08* -0.02* -0.04* -0.02 0.00 -0.06* -0.02* 0.04* -0.02* 0.01* 0.01 -0.04* 0.02* 0.00 -0.01 -0.03* 0.02 1.000         
0.07* -0.02* 0.01 0.02* -0.05* 0.07* -0.02* -0.08* 0.05* 0.05* -0.04* -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 0.01 0.11* 0.01 -0.27* 1.000        
-0.02* -0.30* -0.02* -0.03* -0.02* -0.01 -0.04* 0.04* 0.05* 0.06* -0.02* -0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.04* 0.11* 0.09* 1.000       
0.05* -0.01 -0.01 0.02* -0.07* 0.08* -0.03* -0.01 0.01 0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.03* 0.02 0.01* 0.07* 0.01* -0.08* 0.55* 0.01 1.000      
0.13* 0.13* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.11* -0.05* -0.06* 0.01 0.08* 0.08* -0.07* -0.07* 0.01 0.01 0.05* -0.01 -0.20* 0.38* -0.08* 0.43* 1.000     
0.25* -0.11* 0.31* 0.09* 0.15* -0.09* 0.12* 0.05* -0.01* -0.18* 0.13* 0.22* 0.25* -0.11* -0.01 0.09* -0.13* 0.14* -0.25* -0.02* -0.21* -0.29* 1.000    
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27 Values with asterisk denote that the coefficient is significant at a significance level of 10%. 
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0.03* -0.10* 0.07* 0.01 0.05* -0.07* 0.07* 0.05* -0.04* -0.11* 0.09* 0.07* 0.26* -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 -0.03* 0.15* -0.28* -0.04* -0.23* -0.31* 0.55* 1.000   
0.01* -0.12* 0.10* 0.01 0.06* -0.08* 0.09* 0.05* -0.03* -0.14* 0.11* 0.08* 0.28* -0.05* -0.04* -0.02* -0.05* 0.16* -0.31* -0.04* -0.26* -0.33* 0.45* 0.75* 1.000 
0.51* -0.02* 0.55* 0.17* 0.22* -0.09* 0.13* 0.03* 0.02* -0.21* 0.08* 0.39* 0.19* -0.19* -0.01 0.29* -0.21* -0.03* -0.03* -0.06* -0.04* -0.07* 0.34* 0.14* 0.16* 1.000 
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23 Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix between AF, IMP, WOR, FRP, BEL and control variables (n = 1,272) 
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VAR AF IMP WOR FRP BEL SIZE LIT SEG CUR ROA LEV BETA LOSS AGE NYSE PMC AUDC FIS SPEC GCON RUR POP MALE MINO WAG 
AF 
1.000                         
IMP 
-0.04* 1.000                        
WOR 
-0.05* 0.95* 1.000                       
FRP 
-0.05* 0.97* 0.91* 1.000                      
BEL 
-0.04* 0.95* 0.92* 0.92* 1.000                     
SIZE 
0.87* 0.05* 0.04* 0.05* 0.07* 1.000                    
LIT 
0.36* -0.03* -0.02 -0.04* -0.03* 0.36* 1.000                   
SEG 
0.43* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.38* 0.12* 1.000                  
CUR 
-0.15* -0.10* -0.09* -0.09* -0.11* -0.17* -0.07* -0.12* 1.000                 
ROA 
0.18* 0.04* 0.04* 0.02 0.07* 0.25* 0.06* 0.09* -0.05* 1.000                
LEV 
-0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03* -0.02* -0.02* -0.22* -0.17* 1.000               
BETA 
0.06* -0.08* -0.10* -0.06* -0.09* 0.01 -0.01 -0.03* 0.06* -0.13* 0.03* 1.000              
LOSS 
-0.26* -0.07* -0.06* -0.05* -0.10* -0.36* -0.06* -0.16* 0.06* -0.70* 0.17* 0.13* 1.000             
AGE 
0.20* -0.06* -0.05* -0.07* -0.03 0.19* 0.06* 0.19* -0.04* 0.12* -0.12* -0.06* -0.15* 1.000            
NYSE 
0.57* 0.12* 0.12* 0.10* 0.13* 0.56* 0.19* 0.33* -0.21* 0.20* 0.03* 0.01* -0.28* 0.18* 1.000           
PMC 
0.02* 0.11* 0.10* 0.11* 0.11* 0.05* -0.01 -0.02* -0.04* 0.07* -0.01 0.03* -0.08* 0.02 0.04* 1.000          
AUDC 
-0.18* -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.19* -0.04* -0.06* 0.02* -0.07* 0.02 0.01 0.09* -0.04* -0.12* -0.02* 1.000         
FIS 
0.09* 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.03* 0.09* 0.02* 0.11* -0.04* -0.02* 0.13* 0.01 0.01* -0.09* 0.10* -0.08* 0.00 1.000        
SPEC 
0.20* -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04* 0.19* 0.11* 0.05* -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.04* -0.01 -0.02* 0.10* 0.15* -0.05* 0.02* 1.000       
GCON 
-0.28* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.37* -0.05* -0.13* -0.13* -0.22* 0.14* -0.04* 0.28* -0.07* -0.17* -0.06* 0.09* 0.01 -0.03* 1.000      
RUR 
-0.08* 0.06* 0.07* 0.05* 0.06* -0.04* -0.02 0.01 -0.06* -0.02* 0.04* -0.02* 0.01* 0.01 -0.04* 0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.03* 0.02 1.000     
POP 
0.07* -0.03 -0.08* -0.02 -0.14* 0.01 0.02* -0.05* 0.07* -0.02* -0.08* 0.05* 0.05* -0.04* -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 0.01 0.11* 0.01 -0.27* 1.000    
 
62 
63 
64 
65 
60  
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 Note: Values with asterisk denote that the coefficient is significant at a significance level of 10%. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
MALE -0.02* 0.05* 0.02 0.10* -0.04* -0.02* -0.03* -0.02* -0.01 -0.04* 0.04* 0.05* 0.06* -0.02* -0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.04* 0.11* 0.09* 1.000   
MINO 
0.05* 0.08* -0.01 0.11* -0.09* -0.01 0.02* -0.07* 0.08* -0.03* -0.01 0.01 0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.03* 0.02 0.01* 0.07* 0.01 -0.08* 0.55* 0.01 1.000  
WAG 
0.13* -0.62* -0.59* -0.65* -0.72* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11* -0.05* -0.06* 0.01 0.08* 0.08* -0.07* -0.07* 0.01 0.01 0.05* -0.01 -0.20* 0.38* -0.08* 0.43* 1.000 
 
62 
63 
64 
65 
61 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 Table 5: Audit Fee and Religiosity Measures 
5 
6    
7 Variables Exp. Sign REL IMP WOR FRP BEL 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
(Constant)  2.45 
(15.03)*** 
13.11 
(20.36)*** 
11.07 
(30.20)*** 
12.96 
(26.35)*** 
16.09 
(24.24)*** 
Religiosity - -.251 
(-7.33)*** 
-1.10 
(-8.19)*** 
-1.14 
(-10.82)*** 
-1.25 
(-6.60)*** 
-1.60 
(-9.92)*** 
SIZE + .531 
(33.69)*** 
.536 
(9.93)*** 
.536 
(9.66)*** 
.536 
(9.48)*** 
.535 
(9.50)*** 
LIT + .151 
(28.44)*** 
.172 
(7.44)*** 
.174 
(7.77)*** 
.170 
(7.58)*** 
.173 
(7.42)*** 
SEG + .196 
(16.98)*** 
.194 
(8.02)*** 
.192 
(8.05)*** 
.194 
(8.31)*** 
.196 
(7.91)*** 
CUR - -.006 -.006 -.006 -.005 -.006 
  (-11.67)*** (-0.51) (-.47) (-.45) (-.51) 
ROA - -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 .001 
  (-1.20) (-0.15) (-.19) (-.17) (.03) 
LEV +/- -.002 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
  (-4.64)*** (-1.06) (-1.16) (-1.06) (-1.01) 
BETA +/- .116 
(5.96)*** 
.088 
(10.75)*** 
.089 
(10.45)*** 
.090 
(9.05)*** 
.089 
(10.66)*** 
LOSS + .131 
(30.74)*** 
.170 
(2.68)*** 
.172 
(2.68)*** 
.172 
(2.75)*** 
.168 
(2.70)*** 
AGE - .015 .019 .019 .020 .022 
  (1.01) (24.93)*** (7.30)*** (32.37)*** (22.68)*** 
NYSE + .051 
(2.00)** 
.074 
(9.90)*** 
.072 
(7.28)*** 
.070 
(7.16)*** 
.075 
(7.98)*** 
PMC + 1.87 
(8.66)*** 
13.71 
(3.64)*** 
13.53 
(3.76)*** 
13.51 
(3.72)*** 
13.68 
(3.72)*** 
AUDC +/- -.104 
(-2.47)*** 
-.190 
(-3.65)*** 
-.190 
(-3.80)*** 
-.188 
(-3.49)*** 
-.193 
(-3.57)*** 
FIS + .004 -.036 -.041 -.035 -.037 
  (.52) (-.53) (-.61) (-.51) (-.56) 
SPEC + .115 
(9.75)*** 
.085 
(2.48)** 
.089 
(2.65)** 
.087 
(2.54)** 
.086 
(2.48)** 
GCON + .144 .098 .100 .096 .097 
  (5.41)*** (.57) (.59) (.56) (.57) 
RUR - -.076 -.085 -.068 -.098 -.094 
  (-3.66)*** (-1.49) (-1.32) (-1.94)** (-1.87)* 
POP + .039 .062 .059 .059 .065 
  (25.33) (2.10)** (2.04)** (2.03)** (2.24)** 
MALE ? -3.37 
(-1.83)* 
-9.08 
(-3.91)*** 
-8.67 
(-3.72)*** 
-8.31 
(-3.91)*** 
-11.24 
(-5.29)*** 
MINO ? .014 .439 .228 .481 .330 
  (.11) (6.17)*** (3.11)*** (20.06)*** (6.22)*** 
WAG + .768 .046 .211 .036 -.087 
 
63 
64 
65 
62  
16 
1 
2 
3 
4 (7.38)*** (.55) (2.49)** (.21) (-.78) 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
15 
Adj R2 83.91 83.24 83.20 83.19 83.26 
 
17 
18 Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (2- 
19 tailed). 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Industry dummies included included included included included 
Year dummies included included included included included 
 
N 
 
10,176 
 
1,272 
 
1,272 
 
1,272 
 
1,272 
F 685.30 94.00 93.65 93.63 94.07 
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64 
65 
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1 
2 
3 
4 Table 6: Audit Fee, Religiosity (REL) and Measures of Spatial Competition 
5 
6    
7 Variables Exp. Sign Coef Coef 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
(Constant)  34.23 
(6.23)*** 
2.68 
(9.10)*** 
REL  
- 
 -.217 
(-3.74)*** 
IPS  
+ 
.482 
(7.90)*** 
.532 
(9.30)*** 
DIS  
+ 
.276 *** 
(4.32)*** 
.187 
(2.63)*** 
DIS*IPS  
- 
-.220 
(-5.26)*** 
-.248 
(-4.80)*** 
HER  
? 
-.769 
(-10.85)*** 
-.490 
(-9.79)*** 
IPSN + .473 
(12.73)*** 
.440 
(7.68)*** 
SIZE + .510 
(19.86)*** 
.505 
(19.99)*** 
LIT + .169 
(19.62)*** 
.156 
(15.72)*** 
SEG + .182 
(11.94)*** 
.189 
(15.87)*** 
CUR - -.003 -.008 
  (-.16) (-9.54)*** 
ROA - -.001 -.001 
  (-1.66) (-1.16) 
LEV +/- -.002 
(-6.11)*** 
-.002 
(-4.09)*** 
BETA +/- .107 
(8.15)*** 
.113 
(6.31)*** 
LOSS + .138 
(22.38)*** 
.130 
(17.32)*** 
AGE - .025 .015 
  (2.03)** (1.03) 
NYSE + .014 .033 
  (.77) (1.47) 
PMC + 1.72 
(5.15)*** 
1.85 
(6.54)*** 
AUDC +/- -.070 -.068 
  (-1.91)* (-1.63) 
FIS + .013 .006 
  (1.56) (.53) 
GCON + .124 .149 
  (3.31)*** (4.11) 
RUR -  -.078 
 
63 
64 
65 
64  
11 
23 
1 
2 
3 
4 (-4.15)*** 
5 
6 POP + .044 
7 (15.40)*** 
8 MALE ? -3.65 
9 (-2.56)** 
10 
MINO ? -.006 
12 (-.06) 
13 WAG 
14 + 
15 
16 
.760 
(8.43)*** 
17 Industry dummies included included 
18 Year dummies included included 
19 
20 
21 N 10,176 10,176 
22 
F 648.71 637.88 
24 Prob > F .000 .000 
25 Adj R2 83.61 84.40 
26 
27 
28 Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (2- 
29 tailed). 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
65  
17 
56 
1 
2 
3 
4 Table 7: Audit Fee and Religiosity (REL): Audit Industry Expertise 
5 
6    
7 Variables Exp. 
8 Sign 
9 
State 
Expert 
State Non- 
Expert 
National 
Expert 
MSA 
Expert 
County 
Expert 
10 
(Constant) 1.46 
11 
12 (4.13)*** 
1.83 
(4.38)*** 
2.20 
(9.19)*** 
2.51 
(16.60)*** 
2.49 
(16.07)*** 
13 REL 
14 
-.474 
- (-14.20)*** 
-.259 
(-6.79)*** 
-.252 
(-7.38)*** 
-.259 
(-8.01)*** 
-.255 
(-7.32)*** 
15 SIZE + .477 
16 
(36.87)*** 
18 LIT + .166 
19 (39.59)*** 
20 SEG + .243 
21 
(30.17)*** 
22 
23 CUR - -.019 
24 (-10.45)*** 
25 ROA - .001 
26 (13.96)*** 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 NYSE + .179 
38 
(4.51)*** 
39 
40 PMC + 2.06 
41 (9.50)*** 
42 AUDC +/- -.020 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
(12.90)*** 
57 MALE ? -21.63 
58 (8.37)*** 
.532 
(31.87)*** 
.144 
(37.29)*** 
.188 
(16.69)*** 
-.006 
(-11.57)*** 
-.002 
(-1.67)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.045 
(1.70)* 
1.88 
(8.62)*** 
-.107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(25.67)*** 
-2.08 
(-1.42) 
.531 
(38.29)*** 
.155 
(30.26)*** 
.194 
(16.97)*** 
-.006 
(-8.50)*** 
-.001 
(-1.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.046 
(1.83)* 
1.90 
(8.59)*** 
-.101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(17.23)*** 
-3.06 
(-1.74)* 
.530 
(32.65)*** 
.148 
(27.57)*** 
.195 
(17.19)*** 
-.005 
(-9.29)*** 
-.001 
(-1.24)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.049 
(1.88)* 
1.83 
(8.84)*** 
-.105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(19.16)*** 
-3.15 
(-1.80)* 
.528 
(30.73)*** 
.147 
(26.64)*** 
.194 
(17.69)*** 
-.006 
(-10.68)*** 
-.001 
(-1.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.048 
(1.85)* 
1.82 
(9.26)*** 
-.106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(20.21)*** 
-3.17 
(-1.82)* 
59 MINO ? 1.08 .032 .017 .018 .018 
60 
61 
62 
LEV 
 
BETA 
+/- -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 
(-13.72)*** (-4.85)*** (-5.08)*** (-4.29)*** (-4.27)*** 
+/- .103 .118 .116 .115 .115 
 (7.75)*** (5.24)*** (5.84)*** (6.02)*** (6.13)*** 
LOSS + .208 
(7.51)*** 
.123 
(18.11)*** 
.134 
(27.02)*** 
.130 
(36.85)*** 
.130 
(36.58)*** 
AGE - -.019 .017 .014 .014 .015 
  (9.30)*** (1.09) (.95) (.97) (.98) 
 
 (-.39) (-2.22)** (-2.33)** (-2.47)** (-2.50)** 
FIS + .050 .002 .007 .002 .005 
  (11.06)*** (.23) (.92) (.46) (.68) 
SPEC +   .063 .183 .259 
(5.94)*** (11.36)*** (12.64)*** 
GCON + .235 
(2.60)*** 
.149 
(5.77)*** 
.149 
(4.79)*** 
.140 
(5.47)*** 
.139 
(5.45)*** 
RUR - .109 -.081 -.076 -.077 -.076 
  (.52) (-4.39)*** (-3.48)** (-3.86)*** (-4.00)*** 
POP + .057 .037 .043 .040 .040 
 
63 
64 
65 
66  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
20 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (2- 
21 
tailed). 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
   
(4.32)*** 
 
(.23) 
 
(.14) 
 
(.15) 
 
(.15) 
 WAG  1.96 .771 .769 .751 .755 
  + (11.94)*** (6.92)*** (7.35)*** (7.66)*** (7.63)*** 
 
Industry dummies 
 
included included included included included 
 Year dummies  included included included included included 
        
14 N  720 9,456 10,176 10,176 10,176 
15 F  62.55 591.59 646.38 649.22 651.96 
16 
17 
18 
Prob > F  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Adj R2  86.04 83.39 83.91 83.97 84.03 
 
63 
64 
65 
67  
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3 
4 Endnotes 
5 
6 
7 
1 We employ the term religiosity for reasons of consistency with the growing branch of literature on accounting and 
9 
10 finance (see, for instance, Hilary and Hui, 2009; Vitell, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2012). 
11 
12 
2 This is, inter alia, due to: the dominant influence of Islam in the Middle East and the expansionist tendencies of 
13 
14 both Islam and Christianity in Africa; the continuous growth of Protestantism in Latin America; and the religious 
15 
16 ferments in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union states. In the US, there is a steady increase in religious 
17 
18 denominations and churches as reported in the Religious Congregations and Membership Studies, while the role of 
19 
20 Evangelist Christianity becomes more politically influential (Innaccone, 1998; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). 
21 
22 
3 Such attitudes have been facilitated by influential, organized religious groups which have cooperated to develop 
23 
24 common religious doctrines and codes of conduct that offer practical guidance to those involved in business 
25 
26 (Brammer et al., 2007; ICCR; 2011). 
27 
28 4 This is not to say that one has to be religious in order to have the ability and capacity to expose unaccepted 
29 
30 business practices (i.e., that higher religious adherence increases the possibility of revealing malpractice). 
31 
32 5 Including, inter alia, Quest Diagnostics Inc. and GlaxoSmithKline. 
33 
34 6 Auditing standards, guidelines and professional writings prescribe that an auditor’s engagement decision should be 
35 
36 based upon a thorough assessment of the client which is termed “engagement risk” (Bedard et al., 2008; Danziger, 
37 
38 1999; Ethridge et al., 2007; Kerr et al., 2007; Thomas, 1992; see also SAS No. 109, AU Section 314: Understanding 
39 
40 the Entity and Its Environment (http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/Pages/SAS.aspx., accessed 
41 
42 15 December 2015). An essential component of engagement risk is the client’s business risk which, inter alia, 
43 
44 comprises an assessment of the integrity and attitudes of management, as well as an assessment of the client’s 
45 
46 broader environment along with corporate investment risk. 
47 
48 7 We define corporate headquarters based on the business address rather than the address of incorporation, both 
49 
50 provided by Audit Analytics. We do so to avoid the Delaware effect, i.e. incorporation for tax purposes at Delaware, 
51 
52 as suggested by prior literature (see Allen and Woodland 2010). 
53 
54 8 See official site at www.thearda.com (accessed 16 December 2015). 
55 
56 9  This refers  mainly to  Christianity but  incorporates  all  major organized  religious  groups,  inter  alia  Baha’i, 
57 
58 
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Sikhism, Taoism and Zoroastrianism. 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
68  
1 
2 
3 
4    
5 10 Please see official site at http://www.pewforum.org/2009/12/21/how-religious-is-your-state/ (accessed 16 
6 
7 
December 2015). 
8 
9 11 The US Religious Landscape Survey completed telephone interviews with a nationally-representative sample of 
10 
11 
35,957 adults living in the US who had a home telephone. The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research 
12 
13 
Associates International (PSRAI). Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish by Princeton Data Source, 
14 
15 
LLC (PDS), and Schulman, Ronca and Bucuvalas, Inc. (SRBI) from May 8 to August 13, 2007. Statistical results 
16 
17 
are weighted to correct known demographic discrepancies. Interviewees belong to various religions but the principal 
18 
19 
20 ones are: Evangelical, Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and 
21 
22 Hindu. 
23 
24 
12 According to SEC §229.103, “major” constitutes a proceeding that, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds 10% 
25 
26 of the current assets of the company and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, and/or a proceeding that refers to 
27 
28 sanctions for environmental damages that exceed $100,000. 
29 
30 
13 We have estimated the specialization proxies based on all yearly observations derived from Audit Analytics that 
31 
32 had the minimum information to estimate specialization proxies (i.e. audit fees, name of auditor, location). This 
33 
34 included, on average, around 9,000 observations per year. 
35 
36 14 Please see official site at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/ (accessed 16 December 2015). 
37 
38 
15 Please see official site at http://www.bls.gov/ (accessed 16 December 2015). 
39 
40 16 Estimated as 22% * 2,545,000 (2,545,000 is the average audit fees obtained from Table 3). 
41 
42 17 Our expertise proxies refer to 60 SIC-2 industries, 48 states, 335 counties and 87 MSAs which are comparable to 
43 
44 prior studies (Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Fung et al., 2012). 
45 
46 18 Please see official site at http://www.uschamber.com (accessed 16 December 2015). 
47 
48 19 We are grateful to Arthur Allen for providing directions and data on the estimation of the 150-hour rule. 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
